MEDICAL FUTIUTY AND THE SOCIAL
CONTRACT (WHO ARE THE REAL DOCTORS
ON HOWARD BRODY'S ISLAND?)t
StuartJ Youngner, M.D. *
INTRODUCTION

The term futility seems to capture something that has gone
wrong with medicine in the United States. Driven by a technological imperative, fear of litigation, and a misunderstanding of patient
rights, too often physicians have abrogated their clinical good
sense by offering, or caving into demands for, end-of-life interventions that are "futile." However, a satisfactory operational definition of futility remains elusive.' Complicating matters further,
futility has been co-opted by and confounded with other agendas.
One of those agendas is rationing, society's perceived need to save
scarce resources by refusing to provide marginally beneficial treatments. Another agenda is that of physicians who see futility as an
opportunity to assert a power and authority that is slowly ebbing
away from them.
I am convinced, however, that the original alarm about futility
arose from physicians and nurses who were genuinely concerned
that demands for aggressive interventions like cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) were sometimes part of a desperate ritual of denial, a ritual that caused unnecessary suffering by dying patients
and robbed them of their last vestiges of dignity. Advocates of the
position that physicians can and should act unilaterally on their
own futility judgments have used the concept of professional integrity to justify their position. They recognize the centrality of patient autonomy, but argue that it should not always trump
professional judgment.
For example, Schneiderman, Jecker, and Jonsen call for "restoring a common sense notion of medical duty."2 "So powerful
t This Article was delivered as the Keynote Speech at the Symposium on Medical
Futility, on November 9, 1994, at the Seton Hall University School of Law.
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1 John D. Lantos et al.,
The Illusion of Futility in Clinical Practice,87 AM. J. MED. 81,
82 (1989); Robert D. Truog et al., The Problem With Futility, 326 NEw ENG.J. MED. 1560,
1560 (1992); StuartJ. Youngner, Vh Defines Futility? 260 JAMA 2094, 2094 (1988).
2 Lawrence J. Schneiderman et al., MedicalFutility: Its Meaning and Ethical Implications, 112 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 949, 950 (1990).
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has this notion of autonomy become," they argue, "that its glare
often blinds physicians (and ethicists) to the validity of earlier maxims that had long defined the range of physician's moral obligations toward patients."3 What are these moral obligations? The
American Thoracic Society identifies "the ethical principles of beneficence and nonmaleficence that underlie the practice of
medicine and define its goals," and argues, "[t]o force physicians
to provide medical interventions that are clearly futile would undermine the ethical integrity of the medical profession."4 Echoing
these words, Tomlinson and Brody write that "[a] principle that
denied the physician any power to act on his or her professional
powervalues, rather than the patient's, would leave the physician
5
less to refuse to perform actions that harm patients."
These authors support the notion that society has granted the
medical profession the responsibility and authority to make certain
kinds of medicaljudgments. These inevitably but necessarily involve
values about quality of life and judgments concerning likelihood of
success. 6 Without the ability to exercise such judgments, physicians
would be more like automobile mechanics or lab technicians.
None of these authors argue that physicians' judgments should be
above the law or that physicians should not be accountable to society for their actions. However, society must allow physicians sufficient leeway to exercise professional judgment because any other
course of action would jeopardize their role and status as
professionals.
Tomlinson and Brody also argue that offering patients and
their families interventions that the physician knows will not work
actually undermines autonomy by implying a choice when none
exists.7 As several authors have pointed out, desperation born of
denial and guilt often motivates families' demands for futile treatment.' To cave into such demands would serve only as a "hightechnology placebo."9
Id. at 949.
4 American Thoracic Society, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-sustaining Therapy,
115 ANNALS INTERN. MED. 478, 481 (1991).
5 Tom Tomlinson & Howard Brody, Futility and the Ethics of Resuscitation, 264
JAMA 1276, 1278 (1990).
6 Id. at 1277.
7 Id. at 1279.
8 Schneiderman et al., supra note 2, at 949; StuartJ. Youngner, Futility in Context,
264 JAMA 1295, 1296 (1990); Leslie J.Blackhall, Must We Always Use CPR?, 317 NEw
ENG. J. MED. 1281, 1283 (1987).
9 Blackhall, supra note 8, at 1283.
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Howard Brody makes an eloquent and even romantic plea for
professional integrity:
Suppose that a new island has just been discovered, and explorers from various nations are eagerly planting their flags and laying claim to various pieces of territory. I am trying to plant the
flag of professional integrity somewhere on this island. I am not
claiming that, compared with the territory claimed by autonomy, the territory in which professional integrity rules will be
very large at all; indeed it may turn out to be very small and
hardly worth fighting over. It is simply my goal to establish that
somewhere there is a set of treatment decisions over which professional integrity will hold sway, even against contrary claims of
patient autonomy.' °

I.

THE FLAG OF PROFTIONAL INTEGRrT

The following case illustrates the responsible exercise of professional responsibility and integrity in refusing a demand for futile
treatment.
A.

The Case of Mr. A

Mr. A was a successful biomedical researcher in his early sixties. He had been diagnosed with an aggressive cancer of the bladder two years before I became involved in resolving the ethical
implications of his treatment. From the moment of diagnosis, Mr
A. and his wife clearly informed his physician that they wanted to
"do everything" to treat the cancer aggressively. They had no children. He had undergone surgery to remove his bladder, chemotherapy and radiation treatments. These treatments slowed but did
not stop the progression of his cancer.
From the beginning, the patient had one oncologist who
served also as his primary care physician. Both Mr. A and his wife
had read extensively about his illness and often had suggestions or
advice for the oncologist who was always available to answer their
questions and fill their need for advice and support. When the
couple asked for an experimental chemotherapy protocol, the
oncologist explained the risks and poor likelihood of success, but
provided it. They had excellent insurance that paid well for both
outpatient and hospital treatment.
As the patient became sicker and sicker, the degree of his
wife's emotional dependency on him became evident and her de10 Howard Brody, The Physician's Role in Determining Futility, 42 J. AM. GERIATmRc
Soc'y 875, 876 (1994).
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nial grew more extreme. She began investigating unconventional
therapies and discovered a vitamin which, used in high doses,
could "cure" various types of cancer. When Mrs. A demanded that
the oncologist treat her husband with the vitamin, the oncologist
took her request seriously. She reviewed the evidence for efficacy
and found that the Federal Drug Administration (FDA) had determined that there was none. On the other hand, the oncologist
concluded that administration of the vitamin would not harm Mr.
A and therefore supported the treatment.
Not surprisingly, the patient continued to deteriorate. The
cancer spread to his spine and throughout his abdomen. He was
in a great deal of discomfort, but neither he nor his wife acknowledged that he was dying. "We are going to beat this thing," they
repeatedly told the oncologist. Mrs. A became obsessed with the
details of her husband's care, calling the oncologist late at night
and on weekends because the oncologist had given Mrs. A her
beeper number. The oncologist spent hours talking with Mrs. A.
When the patient was hospitalized with pneumonia and acute
renal failure and admitted to the intensive care unit at his wife's
insistence, radiological studies demonstrated that the malignancy,
which had continued to grow and spread, had now invaded his kidneys. The wife insisted that this was a temporary setback. The patient experienced increasing pain but his mental status had
deteriorated to the point that he could not understand or respond
to questions. His wife was becoming more and more distressed but
insisted that "with a little more time" he would begin responding to
the megavitamin doses that he was now receiving via rectal enemas
because he could no longer take them by mouth. Some nurses
objected to providing this "futile" intervention because of the obvious discomfort it caused him (he had to be turned onto his side in
a painful position) and were not assigned to his care.
All but the wife clearly understood that the patient was dying.
However, she continued to spend almost all her time in the hospital ministering to her husband, focusing on small details of his care
such as lab values and doses of medicine. When it became clear
that his kidneys had shut down, the medical director of the medical intensive care unit (MICU) and the patient's oncologist met
with Mrs. A to discuss how they might make Mr. A's death as comfortable as possible. She would have none of it, insisting that the
hospital put her husband on dialysis, fully resuscitate him if he suffered cardiopulmonary arrest, and attach him to a mechanical ventilator if necessary.
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The treating physicians called the Ethics Consultation Service
to help them resolve the situation. As a consultant with that service, I met with the wife, the oncologist, and the ICU director. The
wife adamantly insisted that her husband was getting better. She
claimed that the vitamin was working because she could see that
the necrotic tumor "was being expelled from his body in his sputum and stool." I have rarely seen desperation this great or denial
this extreme. When the oncologist gently told her this was the end
of the line, Mrs. A accused her of "treating us like we are a
number." Mrs. A turned a deaf ear toward any concerns about her
grief and need for support, refocusing the discussion on "curing"
her husband.
The oncologist and ICU Director held fast. They said Mr. A
was dying and that dialysis, intubation or full resuscitation would,
at best, extend his life for a brief time at the expense of great suffering. They told Mrs. A that they would do everything to keep
him comfortable. When they took this firm position, Mrs. A did
not argue. She turned to other matters over which she still had
control. "I want him to keep getting the vitamin," she insisted.
The physicians agreed. Two days later, Mr. A died a relatively
peaceful death, with his wife present. Her relationship with the
ICU staff remained good throughout.
The case of Mr. A is an excellent example of the responsible
exercise of professional responsibility. Mrs. A, desperately fearful
of her husband's death, was using invasive end-of-life medical interventions as a way of supporting her denial, which had assumed almost psychotic proportions. The interventions she demanded
were not benign. Mr. A's oncologist had provided excellent technical and emotional care. She had functioned as both a specialist
and primary care physician, working diligently and compassionately with the patient and his wife. She had supported their decision to go for the outside chance of a recovery, and had even
acquiesced to an unconventional therapy that was ineffective but
minimally harmful. As the patient neared death, however, the
oncologist was unwilling to participate in Mrs. A's nearly delusional
denial at the expense of her husband's unnecessary suffering. By
drawing the line, Mr. A's physicians acted responsibly and with
integrity.
Consideration of another case in the same hospital, however,
reveals the elusive nature of a clear definition of professional
integrity.
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The Case of Mr. B

A nurse from the surgical intensive care unit (SICU) requested an ethics consultation regarding the care of Mr. B. Mr. B
was a man in his early seventies who had undergone coronary artery bypass surgery. Although he had been otherwise healthy when
he entered the hospital, one thing after another had gone wrong
following the surgery. He developed a pulmonary embolus (blood
clot in the lung) and then suffered a myocardial infarction. Five
weeks later, his kidneys had failed and he was receiving renal
hemodialysis three times a week. He was intubated and attached to
a mechanical ventilator. Because he was semiconscious and unable
to eat or drink, the staff provided nourishment intravenously. The
surgeon was unwilling to consider pulling back from an aggressive
stance. He made daily rounds, but often when the patient's wife
and three children were not present. The patient's family
conversed largely with the nursing staff and expressed their opinion that the patient would never leave the hospital alive. During
infrequent conversations with the surgeon, the family was told that
the patient remained in stable condition and that he was hopeful
the patient would pull through. The family complained to the
nurses that the surgeon was not answering all their questions and
worried that Mr. B was suffering and would not recover. However,
they were unwilling to confront the surgeon with these concerns.
The nurses, who would be responsible for attempting to resuscitate the patient if he suffered cardiac arrest (i.e., would have to
administer chest compressions), urged the surgeon to write a donot-resuscitate (DNR) order. The nurse who called me for an ethics consultation said the surgeon was annoyed, but had reluctantly
agreed to write the order. However, the next day the surgeon had
still not placed a DNR order in the chart or talked with the family.
When the patient's blood pressure began to drop, the nurses
talked to the surgical resident who was covering for the surgeon
while he was in surgery and asked him to write the DNR order. He
demurred. The patient stabilized, however, rendering moot the issue of resuscitation. The nurse requested that I talk with the surgeon about his failure to write a DNR order in the chart. The
hospital policy clearly states that DNR orders are not valid unless
they are written by a physician in the medical record.
The surgeon returned my phone call and I met him the next
day in his office. He maintained that the patient's situation was
not hopeless. He reluctantly accepted that he should write a DNR
order because if the patient's heart stopped, it was unlikely that the
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staff could restart it. However, the surgeon stated that he was unhappy with the nurses who, he felt, were "too negative and should
get back to taking care of patients rather than worrying about the
things that are really the business of physicians." He noted that the
surgical intensive care unit had a different "philosophy" from the
medical intensive care unit (where Mr. A had died). "They kill
people in the MICU," he said. When I pressed him to explain this
provocative statement, he backed off a bit, "The MICU physicians
are ready to give up too early. They pull the plug when they should
be trying to save life."
I did not ask the surgeon to defend his aggressive "philosophy," but I am sure that if I had he would have done so, much as
Mr. A's physicians did, by appealing to the internal values and
goals of medicine and a sense of professional integrity. How are we
to understand the notion of professional integrity when the only
common ground between the physicians treating Mr. A and Mr. B
is their conviction that their judgment and experience should prevail? Schneiderman and his colleagues argue that physicians
should be true to the goals of medicine by refusing to provide
treatments that fall below a certain threshold of quantitative or
qualitative benefit to the patient. The physicians of Mr. A and Mr.
B had very different conceptions of that threshold. In fact, the
judgments about qualitative and quantitative futility vary from physician to physician 1 ' and often from service to service.12 A more
disturbing issue is that demographic factors such as the specific illness or age of the patient may inequitably influence physicians' futility judgments." A recent study by Curtis et al. found that the

non-white race of the patient independently predicted a futility
judgment resulting in a DNR order. 4
These observations raise the question: if you are a patient in
11 J. Randall Curtis et al., Use of the MedicalFutility Rationale in Do-Not-Attempt-Resuscitation Orders, 273JAMA 124, 128 (1995); S. Van McCrary et al., Physician's Quantitative
Assessments of Medical Futility, 5 J. CGIN. ETmics 100, 100-105 (1994).
12 See generally Stuart J. Youngner et al., Resolving Problems at the Intensive Care Unit/
Oncology Interface, 31 PIRsp. Bio. & MED. 299 (1988) (describing the different clinical
perspectives and experiences that exist in the hematology-oncology unit and the medical intensive care unit at University Hospitals of Cleveland).
13 Kevin M. McIntyre, Failure of 'tredictors'of CardiopulmonaryResuscitation Outcomes
to Predict Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation Outcomes, 153 ARcHvEs INTERN. MED. 1293,
1295 (1993); Mark Rosenberg et al., Results of Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation: Failureto
Predict Survival in Two Community Hospitals, 153 ARcrvs INTERN. MED. 1370, 1374
(1993); Carlo Vitelli et al., CardiopulmonayResuscitation and the Patient With Cancer,9J.
CGIN. ONCOL. 111, 114 (1991).
14 Curtis et al., supra note 11, at 128.
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need of hospitalization and wash up on the shores of Dr. Brody's
island, which flag of professional integrity will fly over your beach?
II.

DOCTOR/PATIENT RELATIONSHIP
(SOMETIMES THERE IS NO FLAG)

When physicians use the notion of professional integrity to defend their unilateral treatment decisions, they do so in the context
of a presumed ideal physician/patient relationship. Such a relationship implies continuity over time, good communication, and a
general sharing of basic values. The following cases illustrate how
far short of this ideal we can fall.
A.

The Case of Mrs. C

A medical resident, who described Mrs. C's family as "making
unreasonable demands" on the staff to treat her aggressively, requested an ethics consultation. Two years before my involvement
with the case began, Mrs. C had suffered a severe stroke which left
her in a persistent vegetative state. Since that stroke, she resided in
a nursing home where she was fed through a gastrostomy tube.
She was admitted to the hospital several times with pneumonia.
This time she was quite unstable; her blood pressure was low and it
appeared that she might be developing a blood infection (sepsis).
Her family insisted that the hospital transfer her to the medical
intensive care unit. Mrs. C's physicians opposed the transfer to intensive care as inconsistent with their role as physicians. They cited
an assertion in the medical literature that persistently vegetative
patients placed in intensive care fall below a minimum acceptable
threshold quality of life. 5
Mrs. C was an African-American. Her family was from the inner city. The county nursing home had assigned a physician to
Mrs. C's care, but that physician did not have admitting privileges
at the hospital and was in no way involved with her care there.
When I met with the family, the only physician present was an "acting intern," a fourth year medical student who, with added supervision, had taken on the responsibilities of an intern. This student
was especially competent and concerned. The patient's husband
and son were clearly angry. "Why don't you want to save our
mother?" they asked. When the physician explained that there was
no chance that the patient would ever regain consciousness, the
family was unmoved. "You just don't want to spend the money on
15 Schneiderman et al., supra note 2, at 952.
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her," they replied. In fact, the patient's physicians had raised the
waste of resources issue, although not in the family's presence.
The physicians replied that they thought aggressive treatment was
futile.
The patient's son complained that they never met with the
same physician when they came to the hospital. "And look at what
we have now. A medical student" he exclaimed. "He's not even a
real doctor. How can we trust what he tells us?" When the medical
student offered to remove himself from the case, the family became visibly shaken. "No. Don't do that," they pleaded. "He's the
only one who spends time with us and our dad. The other doctors
are too busy. Why can't he be our doctor all the time?" The medical student explained that he would be leaving in five days because
it was the end of the month and he had to "rotate" to a different
ward at a different hospital. "Who will take your place?" they
asked. The answer was a simple "I don't know."
When I tried to find a senior physician who would follow the
patient and family through this hospitalization and probable
others, I did not succeed. Physicians with offices outside the hospital could not afford the time it would take to come to the hospital
to manage this case, which would also compensate them very little
for their efforts. Full-time staff physicians had clearly defined
months during which they had responsibility for the care of inpatients. They were busy doing research and writing grants to support that research during the remaining months.
B.

The Case of Mr. D

Mr. D was a fifty-five-year-old man with leukemia. He had received high dose chemotherapy and a bone marrow transplant. He
had a difficult course with recurrent pneumonia and gastrointestinal bleeding. His own bone marrow had not yet begun to make
white blood cells. It was not clear if this situation was secondary to
the chemotherapy or if his leukemia had become active again. The
patient was on an experimental oncology unit where the patient,
family, and health professionals knew they were going for a "long
shot." When the patient became severely ill, the physician transferred him to the medical intensive care unit (MICU). There, the
hospital could more effectively monitor his vital signs and employ
aggressive life-sustaining interventions such as mechanical ventilation and drugs (vasopressors) to maintain blood pressure.
The MICU physicians and nurses were not enthusiastic about
the transfer. They had seen many such patients die in their "high
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tech" environment. These deaths were often prolonged, uncomfortable, and "undignified." Mr. D and his family had grown used
to the physicians and nursing staff on the oncology unit. Now they
had an entirely new group of physicians and nurses with whom to
interact. Mr. D's oncologist remained active in the case, visiting
every day, briefly reviewing the patient's progress and speaking
with the family. There were other physicians involved in the case
as well-consultants from gastroenterology, infectious disease, and
cardiology. For the MICU staff, Mr. D was a dying patient who had
been sent to die a high tech death because his oncologist was unable to confront his family with the "truth." Continued aggressive
intervention was "futile." To his oncologist, Mr. D was very sick and
might well die, but was still "salvageable." Each view was presented
to Mr. D's family, either directly or by implication.
To the various consultants, Mr. D was not so much a whole
patient as he was an organ or organ system. Every day the consultants came by with a group of fellows, residents and medical students in tow. They examined the "appropriate" part of the patient,
examined the "relevant" lab tests, and answered questions from the
family about his bleeding gastric ulcer ("He is showing no evidence
of blood in his stool."), his blood infection ("Good news. The
blood cultures are not growing any bugs."), and his irregular heart
beat ("Good news. His heart is responding to medication.").
To make matters worse, there was a complete turnover of intensive care unit and consulting physicians at the end of the
month. A new "rotation" of attending, resident, and student physicians from each service "took over" the care of the patient. Nursing provided the greatest continuity of care, but the nurses worked
shifts and took days off. When they were not on duty, the nurses
were not available to the family or patient. Mr. D had a family
doctor who lived in a city ninety miles from the hospital. He had
not been involved in the case for over three months. When the
family became so confused and full of despair that they demanded
outside intervention, the physicians called for an ethics
consultation.
The cases of Mr. C and Mr. D illustrate structural problems of
the medical care system. When patients are in the hospital for two
or three days and have a straightforward medical condition, these
problems may not surface. However, during prolonged hospital
stays with high diagnostic and therapeutic uncertainty and marked
social and ethnic disparity between patients and staff, the short-

1995] MEDICAL FUTILITY AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT

1025

comings of the system come out in bold relief.1 6 Can physicians
eschew responsibility for these shortcomings while at the same time
using the trump of professional integrity to deny patient and family
requests for life-sustaining interventions? Can they appeal to the
physician/patient relationship as the cornerstone of the health
care system when it is increasingly hard to come by? I think not.
CONCLUSION

Defenders of futility argue that a physician's refusal to provide
"futile" treatment at the end of life serves a patient's interests. This
claim rings hollow when those same physicians "hand off" their dying patients to other physicians at the boundaries between months,
services, or hospital and community-returning to their laboratories, teaching responsibilities, or busy office practices. The claim
further loses force in the face of multiple simultaneous physician/
patient relationships, none of which are focused on the patient as a
whole. The claim of professional integrity seems particularly ironic
when physicians and their institutions use market values to determine which patients will or will not receive the benefits of their
professional integrity.
As we attempt to restructure our health care system, these
problems are receiving little attention. Health policy experts extol
primary care as a cost-saving strategy, yet often seem oblivious to its
real meaning and value. Managed care frequently forces patients
to switch physicians as health management organizations (HMOs)
and corporations play musical chairs. Managed care can surreptitiously (without patient knowledge and consent) place the physician in a conflict of interest between benefit to the patient and cost
savings to the managed care entity.17 As physicians increasingly
view themselves as employees, they will opt for smaller work loads
and less demanding schedules. Perhaps the notion of "my patient"
or "my doctor" will only exist during "eight to five" office hours. At
night, weekends and in the hospital, strangers will take care of
strangers. Of course, many patients will continue to have little or
no access to physicians unless they are deathly ill, a circumstance in
which they are unlikely to be receptive to physicians' futility
judgments.
16 StuartJ. Youngner, Applying Futility: Saying No Is Not Enough, 42 J. AM. GERIATRIC
Soc'v 887, 887-889 (1994).
17 Susan M. Wolf, Health Care Reform and the Future of Physician Ethics, HASTINGS
CENTER REP., Mar.-Apr. 1994, at 28; Ezekiel J. Emanuel & Allan S. Brett, Managed
Competition and the Patient-PhysicianRelationship. 329 NEw ENG. J. MED. 879, 880 (1993).
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Development of a system that provides and nurtures real physician/patient relationships for all of our citizens may simply not
be possible. If this is so, the assertion of professional integrity will
become irrelevant to everyone but the physicians who cling desperately to their dwindling authority and prestige. The flags of professional integrity may become rare indeed.

